Epistemology and public policy: Using a new typology to analyse the paradigm shift in Finnish transport futures research by Tapio, P. & Hietanen, O.
Futures 34 (2002) 597–620
www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
Epistemology and public policy: using a new
typology to analyse the paradigm shift in
Finnish transport futures studies
Petri Tapio ∗, Olli Hietanen
Environmental Research Units, Finland Futures Research Centre, Turku School of Economics and
Business Administration, PO-Box 110, Fin-20521 Turku, Finland
Abstract
The aim of the article is to present a new typology of paradigms of futures studies with
specific focus on decision-making. Possible roles of futurists and other actors in long-term
planning and decision-making processes are formed using logical analysis. The resulting seven
schools of thought are interpreted in the light of literature of futures studies and planning
theory. Connections to the philosophical discussion on the role of knowledge and values in
policy recommendations are presented as well. Some futures studies methodological appli-
cations are attached to the paradigms. The new typology forms a gradient from technocracy
performed by professionals to direct citizen participation. Finally, the paradigm shift of Finnish
national transport futures studies is analysed using the new typology.  2002 Elsevier Science
Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Typologies of futures studies paradigms
Several typologies of futures studies paradigms1 have been formed in the last
decades. We begin with a short review of six typologies and conclude that they are
limited to three schools of thought. A question can be raised as to whether the
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are understood generally. When describing the typologies by different authors we use their own concepts.
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multitude of alternative ways ‘to do the job’ is encompassed. We suggest that the
role of the futurist as a professional, and the roles of the decision-maker and the
public, could be characterised in a more diverse way in a long-term policy-mak-
ing process.
Applying the Futulogic method, we open the space of logically possible roles of
professionals and other actors in policy processes. After forming 343 logically poss-
ible hypothetical schools of thought we cut the open space with the continuum of
extreme technocracy to extreme citizen participation. The scanning produces 15
hypothetical schools of thought which are analysed in terms of relevance and hence
reduced to seven. The methodology is explained in detail in the appendix.
Then, we show the connections of the role of professionals and other actors within
the seven paradigms to some practices in futures studies. We also attach the para-
digms to the philosophical discussion of the role of values and knowledge in making
policy recommendations. It is important to keep in mind our strict focus on only
these two aspects in this article. No complete summary of typologies of futures
studies paradigms is made here.2
Finally, we use the new typology to analyse the paradigm shift of the futures
studies of Finnish transport administration in the 1990s. The approach of the article
is illustrated in Fig. 1.
1.1. Probable, possible and preferable
Roy Amara [5, p. 26] made his famous typology of the three “goals” of futurists
20 years ago. For the goal of possible, futurists form perceptions of the future by
conceiving and describing possible paths in an image-driven and visionary manner.
Fig. 1. The approach of the article.
2 For example, the typology of Linstone et al. includes techno-economic, organisational and personal
“perspectives” [3]. It emphasises the different entities to be analysed in a futures study. Pentti Malaska
has presented a typology including as many as six “modes of thinking”: utopian thinking, dystopian
thinking, thinking by analogy, systems thinking, scenario approach and evolutionary thinking [4]. His
typology stresses the multitude of substantial and methodological approaches. The focus of our article
does not do justice to these two typologies.
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For the goal of probable, futurists study likely alternatives by examining particular
paths in detail, in an analytically-driven and exploratory manner. For the goal of
preferable, futurists make choices to bring about a particular feature. They express
preferences for, and work to, implement particular paths. Amara argued that the
goals are not mutually exclusive and that many futurists perform all of the roles.
However, the goals are of a different nature and Amara’s typology seems to be the
starting point for further typologies of different schools of thought in futures studies.
1.2. Technical, hermeneutic/practical and emancipatory
Ju¨rgen Habermas’ well-known typology of the three “interests of knowledge”
[6, pp. 60–65; 7, pp. 19–24] was applied to futures studies by several authors in the
1970s and 1980s. It seems that A˚ ke Sandberg [8, pp. 25–28] was the first, although
he relied on Gerard Radnitzky’s [9] interpretation of Habermas. The English volume
of Sandberg’s book [10, pp. 29–32] asserted the same typology of technical, her-
meneutic and emancipatory interests of knowledge. Richard Slaughter presented
another version of Habermas’ typology in 1982 [11, pp. 17–20; 12, pp. 135–146],
applying practical instead of hermeneutic interest of knowlegde, refering more
directly to Habermas’ original text. Mika Mannermaa [13, pp. 660–662] modified
and cross-matrixed Sandberg’s version of the three interests and Amara’s goals. The
result can be formed as follows:
In the technical interest of knowledge the aim is to search for objective trends
and alternatives are considered irrelevant (possibility). Forecasting is the main task
of a study (probability) and values are considered inessential, unscientific and/or self-
evident (desirability). In the hermeneutic interest of knowledge, the “…main purpose
is communication between people in a society and different tasks of futures research
melt into a common understanding of the social reality” [13, p. 660]. In the emanci-
patory interest of knowledge the aim is to increase alternatives making impossible
into possible (possibility). The probable is considered a reference alternative and
usually an object of criticism (probability). In the emancipatory model it is more
important to act in favour of the desirable future than search for a probable alterna-
tive.
1.3. Extrapolation, utopia and vision
In the early 1980s, Eleonora Barbieri Masini [14, pp. 45–46] developed another
typology of three futures studies “approaches” based on an article by Peter Henrici.
Extrapolation is an approach that includes an analysis of what may happen in relation
to the data, information and knowledge of the past and present. It thus means wider
actions than trend extrapolation by extending Amara’s probable with aspects of the
possible. We would say that what is extrapolated in this approach is not the trend
but the structure of the past and present.
Utopian approach means the “…building of a future different from the present”
[14, p. 45]. It concentrates on invention, innovation and imagination of highly desir-
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able or non-desirable futures. This approach is similar to Amara’s preferable goal
and Mannermaa’s emancipatory interest of knowledge.
The third approach is labelled vision, combining the first two approaches. It
includes bringing the value considerations of utopias down to concrete programmes
by relating them to the data, information and knowledge of past and present. The
approach lacks clear correspondence to Amara’s and Mannermaa’s typologies, but
rather presents a synthesis of them.
1.4. Predictive, cultural and critical
Sohail Inayatullah presented a somewhat similar typology of “epistemologies”,
or “approaches” as Sandberg, Slaughter and Mannermaa earlier [15]. Inayatullah’s
typology also had three schools of thought.
The predictive–empirical approach includes instrumentalist, rationalist ways of
predicting the future accurately. The approach is equal to Sandberg’s, Slaughter’s
and Mannermaa’s technical interest of knowledge. Inayatullah strongly connected
mathematical modelling to this school of thought. With accurate predictions prefor-
med by the professional (“planner”), the decision-makers could better adapt to the
coming state of the world [15, pp. 117–119].
The cultural–interpretative approach includes understanding of different values
and cultures, different ways of approaching the future, negotiating about the different
alternatives and acting in order to achieve the desired future [15, pp. 122–128]. The
cultural—interpretative approach can be seen as a convergence of the
hermeneutic/practical and emancipatory interests of knowledge by Sandberg and
Slaughter. Masini’s concept vision includes similar ideas as well.
What is then left for the third critical-post-structuralist approach? Inayatullah
regarded the kind of emancipatory critical approach that Sandberg, Slaughter and
Mannermaa had in mind as a revised version of the Enlightenment project, which
for him appeared as the actual problem instead of a source of doing things better.
Rather he saw a better option in the Foucauldian “post-structuralism”, i.e. taking
distance to the concrete planning situation, analysing the historical context of the
situation, analysing and revealing the power relations inherent in the language that
different participants have, assessing and if needed changing the power relations and
making the future problematic [15, pp. 128–136, 140–141].3
In sum, Inayatullah crystallised the difference between the three approaches by
specifying that the predictive approach aims at solving (technical) problems, the
cultural approach aims at identifying alternative futures and the critical approach
aims at making the future problematic [15, p. 141].
3 Inayatullah wrote that a weakness of the critical-post-structural approach was the lack of suitable
methods for such an analysis. Later he developed casual layered analysis for this purpose and included
action learning to the critical—post-structural approach [16].
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1.5. Positivism, critical realism and post-positivism
Wendell Bell [17, pp. 196–209] also formed three “epistemologies” for futures
studies, namely positivism, critical realism and post-positivism. Positivism by Bell
means the same as the probable of Amara, technical interest of knowledge of Sand-
berg, Slaughter and Mannermaa and predictive—empirical approach of Inayatullah.
Post-positivism describes rather similar features to Inayatullah’s critical-post-struc-
turalist approach. The main difference is that for Inayatullah this was the ideal school
of thought, whereas for Bell it was the object of criticism.
While positivism is the thesis and post-positivism its antithesis, critical realism
by Bell is the synthesis of the two. It seems not to correspond any of the formulations
of Amara, Masini, Sandberg, Slaughter, Mannermaa or Inayatullah. It consists of the
idea of forming alternative possible futures and evaluating which of them is objec-
tively good. It contains citizen participation in forming desirable or preferable futures
but it also includes the idea that the citizen may be wrong. The objective evaluation
of a future image (or scenario, development etc.) should be made by following the
scheme of Keekok Lee’s epistemic implication model relying on objective facts
instead of subjective statements.
1.6. Descriptive, scenario paradigm and evolutionary
Later Mannermaa published another typology of futures research: descriptive
futures research, scenario paradigm and evolutionary futures research [18]. The
descriptive futures research is identical to the earlier technical interest of knowledge
by the same author, Sandberg and Slaughter. The scenario paradigm includes for-
ming alternative possible and preferable futures and choosing one of them. It rep-
resents a combination of Amara’s possible and preferable and of Sandberg’s and
Slaughter’s hermeneutic/practical and emancipatory interests of knowledge.
Mannermaa also discerned a paradigm of evolutionary futures research, which is
based on the complexity discourse of system theory and especially on the works of
the “Brussels school” [19] and Ervin Laszlo [20]. It includes the idea that society
evolves through phases of linear development with fairly accurate predictability as
well as through chaotic bifurcations where predictability is very low and human
decisions and actions are essential. The goal of evolutionary futures research is to
make forecasts in linear phases, identify bifurcations and make future assessments.
It is interesting to note that the first paradigm in all of the six typologies is very
similar, only Masini’s concept of extrapolation being a little wider. The similarity
implies that there really is a discernible positivistic-technocratic-extrapolative-predic-
tive-descriptive school of thought among futurists or at least in governmentary and
business practise. The two other paradigms in the typologies differ, although the
ideas presented in Amara’s framework seem to be included in the other typologies
as well. One school of thought in each typology differs significantly from those in
other typologies and seems to represent the ideas that the author him/herself was in
favour of.
These features lead us to two questions: Why are there only three schools of
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thought presented in these six typologies? Could there be more paradigms, even
relevant paradigms? We consider it important to continue the work of the authors
and construct a more delicate typology.
2. A new typology
This section presents a new typology of seven schools of thought in futures studies.
The emphasis is on the different roles of actors in a long-term planning and decision
making process. We are interested in three groups: the professionals, the decision-
makers and the public.
Professionals are typically employed futurists, planning officers, consultants,
scientists, engineers, medical experts, teachers or other humans considered pos-
sessing more specific or legitimate knowledge of a substance than laypersons.
Decision-makers consist typically of political bodies, managers, judges, councils,
tribe meetings or other people having a responsibility and legitimacy of the final
decision. The public consists of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), such as
lobbying groups, residential organisations, religious communities, less organised one
issue movements and of course individual citizens.
The groups are by no means static. One person could be in all groups depending
on the actual social context of decision-making, for example a university professor
in economics might be a professional in making econometric forecasts for the
government, a decision-maker in his faculty council and a member of the public
considering land use planning near his home. It is important to emphasise that none
of the three groups is considered to consist of only middle-aged, middle-class western
men, but senior citizens, women and young people are included. Even a nomad child
wandering with her family in Sudan might have a role as a professional in the
decision-making process of how to use scarce firewood resources in a given area.
The reader is invited to see the articles in Rescuing All Our Futures [21] for more
of this point.
The Futulogic method is used to create a new typology of seven schools of thought
(see Appendix). The typology forms a continuum from technocracy performed by
the professionals to direct citizen participation. The formulation is focused on the
logical connections rather than the socio-historical context of each school of thought.
The socio-historical context would add insight to the analysis but is beyond the scope
of this article (see [16,22–24]). The typology serves as a framework to analyse the
empirical case of transport futures studies in Section 3 of this article.
There are obvious connections of the formed seven schools of thought to the
epistemological, methodological and social philosophical debate found in futures
research as well as philosophy. We use this discussion as a theoretical context in
interpreting the concrete ways to define the roles of different actors in a long-term
decision-making process. Especially the role of (expert) knowledge and values in
making policy recommendations are analysed. Some aspects of planning theory are
also added to the analysis to further define the approaches of participatory democ-
racy.
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2.1. Comtean positivism
In the first school of thought we assume that the whole decision-making process
is carried out by professionals. The professional forms the alternatives and, finds out
the most probable one, which is then implemented as a fact in the more detailed
planning process. Implicitly, the professional has then also made the most
important decision.
The positivist philosophy would serve as the most adequate supporting argument
for this rationale. We are thinking of Comtean positivism rather than of the logical
positivist school of thought of the Vienna circle, which did not concentrate on making
rules on making policy recommendations. Another well-argued source would be the
naturalistic value-objectivism found in Plato’s promotion of “serious thinkers”
[25, pp. 55–61], which has been criticised by e.g. Beck [26, pp. 31–32] and Sardar
[23, p. 2]. The main line of Comte’s argument is that with sufficient research pro-
fessionals will find out the invariances of society the same way natural scientists
determine the laws of nature. In this way decision-makers can adapt to the natural
laws of society. No value considerations nor democracy is needed [27, pp. 410–437,
459–473; 28, pp. 62–64].
Among futures researchers the positivist school of thought is often criticised but
seldom defended and not even explicitly stated. However, numerous practices have
been organised according to the positivist principle, such as the transport and energy
forecasts in various countries [29–32]. The approach is similar to the concepts of
probable by Amara, technical interest of knowledge and descriptive futures research
by Sandberg, Slaughter and Mannermaa, predictive-empiristic approach of Inayatul-
lah and positivism by Bell, as described in Section 1.
Comte himself did not favour mathematics but direct empirical observations. How-
ever, his philosophy was imported to the United States by the logical positivists of
the Vienna circle. It was then adopted to legitimise the American empiristic tradition
of social sciences, which relied heavily on mathematical tools [33, pp. 1510–1511].
Thus trend extrapolation and other types of deterministic mathematical modelling
have historical and epistemological connections to Comte’s thinking. Another con-
nection of positivist futures research can be traced back to Rostowian unilinear devel-
opmental theory [34].
2.2. Optimistic humanism
The second school of thought states that the professionals formulate the possible
alternatives and also evaluate the alternatives. Final decision-making is left for the
decision-makers.
This approach has connections to the “critical realism” by Bell [17,35]. According
to him, futures researchers should not only outline possible alternatives but also
assess which one of the alternatives is best [35, p. 1]. The justification for this task
is that values are suggested to be able to be evaluated objectively. Bell seems to
think that (liberal) democracy is one of the objective values and therefore the
decision-makers are supposed to make the final decision [17, p. 236]. This line of
604 P. Tapio, O. Hietanen / Futures 34 (2002) 597–620
argument has one problem that Bell seems not to have solved yet: If the goodness
of a given alternative is already objectively assessed by the futurist what is left for
the decision-maker to decide upon—right and wrong decision?
Not many practices of futures studies follow this school of thought. Bell has
attempted it by applying Keekok Lee’s “epistemic implication model” for analysis
of which of future alternatives are truly good. Lee [36] has made a programme for
social ethics based on a “naturalistic” and “rational” analysis of and conclusions
from the laws of thermodynamics. Some applications of cost-benefit analysis might
be regarded as practical tools for rational evaluation (see e.g. [37]).4 The rational
planning doctrine in planning theory seems to strive for the same goal as well [39].
Bell’s approach seems unique with regard to the five other typologies reviewed in
chapter 1, but it could be connected to the predictive-empirist approach by Inayatul-
lah, evolutionary futures research by Mannermaa and extrapolation approach by Mas-
ini.
2.3. Pluralistic humanism
In the third school of thought the professional forms the alternative futures, the
decision-maker evaluates them with the help of the professional and the decision-
maker chooses one alternative.
There is a fundamental philosophical difference between this approach and the
optimistic humanism described above, as Pentti Malaska has noted recently [40].
The approach implies that there are no objective values to conduct the evaluation.
A connection can therefore be established to the Humean ‘guillotine’: values and
knowledge ought to be separated and decisions cannot be made on the basis of
knowledge alone [41, pp. 415, 457].5 Also Popper (e.g. [43, pp. 378, 383–396])
spoke for a more open society with less respect for authorities and criticised strongly
historicism, i.e. determinism [44].6 Georg Henrik von Wright has formed principles
of deontic logic, “technical norms”, that can be seen as a compatible basis for this
school of thought. The purpose of applied scientists would be to analyse and produce
means to certain ends, i.e. ‘if you want to achieve that goal, you should take this
kind of action’ [45].
Pluralistic humanism is present in the “what—if” approach in futures studies (e.g.
4 Cost-benefit analysis has also been criticised of anti-democratic features (e.g. [38]).
5 Hume [41, p. 415] declared: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them”. Hume is perhaps more famous of his
promotion of a posteriori reasoning over a priori reasoning, i.e. being ‘the father of empirism’, but this
feature of his philosophy is not of primary concern here (see e.g. [42, pp. 42—50]).
6 We have the ideas of Popper and Bell in different categories although Bell explicitly states his critical
realism is in line with that of Popper’s. The reason is that Bell is in favour of objective observable criteria.
Popper [43, pp. 387—388] did argue in line with Bell that a policy discourse should not end by accepting
different contradictory statements equally good, but a critical discussion should always be continued. But
this is not saying that a policy is objectively better than another. Popper rather emphasises the incremen-
talist process of trial and error than that of logical proof [43, p. 386].
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[46, pp. 37–40],7 or “secondary forecasts”, as Bertrand de Jouvenel [48, p. 55] called
them. Scenarios are typically made in a manner that the futures researcher makes
the scenarios and the decision-maker is supposed to choose one, or in some cases
several. The French school of la prospective includes the same basic idea [49,50].
The approach corresponds Mannermaa’s concept of scenario paradigm and locates
close to Amara’s possible and Inayatullah’s cultural-interpretative approach. Masini’s
vision-oriented approach seems to encompass this as well.
2.4. Polling democracy
A step to a more participatory direction would be the scheme in which a pro-
fessional forms the alternatives, but the evaluation of the alternatives is based on,
for example, weighting of criteria by a decision-maker and surveying public opinion.
The gathering of data on opinions, say, by questionnaires or computer programmes,
is performed by the professional. The final decision is made by the decision-maker.
The relation between values and knowledge is similar to the pluralistic humanism
described above. The emerging assumption in this paradigm is that perhaps the par-
liamentary democratic system is reacting too slowly or in a biased way to citizens’
changing values and attitudes. That is why an inquiry on public opinion is needed
to complement the contribution of the decision-maker [29, pp. 466–468; 51, p. 71;
52, pp. 202–203].8
This approach is highly logical but the authors are not aware of many such empiri-
cal experiments made in the discipline of futures studies. Some public hearing pro-
cedures of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) processes in the US as well
as televoting might be understood as examples [52]. An urban motorway construction
process in Finland also included opinion polling [29]. Some decision analysis and
risk assessment methods include weighing of consequences of the alternatives and
calculating the subjective optimum alternative [53,54, pp. 57–78]. This school of
thought is on the borderline of Amara’s possible, probable and preferable. Man-
nermaa’s scenario paradigm, Inayatullah’s cultural-interpretative epistemology and
Masini’s vision approach encompass this school of thought. It is difficult to determine
whether it could be based in Bell’s category of critical realism because of the empha-
sis on ‘what people think is right’ instead of ‘what is right’.
2.5. Critical pragmatism
In this approach the basic assumption of the professional’s capacity to outline the
‘real’ possible alternative futures is abandoned. The professional is only helping
decision-makers and the public to form alternatives which they themselves consider
7 The ‘what—if’ concept includes also other kinds of interpretations. For example Ravetz defined it
as an approach that focuses on highly uncertain impacts of an action which cannot be modeled or otherwise
predicted, i.e. what if something goes wrong [47].
8 Coates reminds that poorly constructed polls are less worthy than no information at all [51, p. 71].
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relevant. The evaluation of the alternatives is to be made by public discussions among
decision-maker and the public and the final decision is made by the decision-maker.
The philosophical point is that the separation of knowledge and values is not seen
as possible at least when forming recommendations. Because all knowledge relevant
to decision-making is seen as theory-, interest- and value-laden, the division of labour
in forming technical norms is not considered functional. Thus it is best to invite the
public to the beginning of the process as well. The position has been suggested at
least by planning theorist John Forester from whom the concept of critical pragma-
tism is adopted [55, pp. 1–14, 24–35, 124–125]. The approach combines the doctrines
of pragmatist philosophy and critical theory. The goal of consensus is not adopted
here. A package of acceptable rules of social discourse is usually recommended in
the critical-pragmatist tradition such as the ideal communication9 of Apel and Hab-
ermas [7, pp. 38–40; 56, pp. 97–169; 57, pp. 369–452; 58; 59].
This kind of approach has been practised quite often in futures research, for
example future workshops [60,61], scenario workshops [62] and visionary manage-
ment [63]. Also the Delphi method can be applied in a way that supports such rules
for argumentation [64, pp. 88–89; 65, pp. 83, 131–132; 66]. Recently Keskinen has
developed a model of “porous decision making” emphasising organised citizen par-
ticipation in the information society [67, pp. 248–252]. The school seems to be simi-
lar to Sandberg’s, Slaughter’s and Mannermaa’s hermeneutic/practical interest of
knowledge and Inayatullah’s cultural-interpretative approach and be under the larger
category of Masini’s vision approach. It seems to locate in the borderline of Bell’s
critical realism and post-positivism.
2.6. Relativistic pragmatism
The next approach would be to abandon the belief in the professional’s capacity
to organise the process of forming the alternative futures as well, and ‘reduce’
her/him to an ordinary citizen. Then the decision-maker and the public would be
forming the alternatives as well as evaluating them and the decision-maker would
be making the final decision.
Philosophically the difference between this approach and the previous critical
pragmatism can be understood as the difference between the positions of Habermas
(e.g. [55]) and Richard Rorty [68, pp. 343–344, 377–389; 69, pp. 173–174]. Hab-
ermas believed in a systematic organised discussion following the principles of the
ideal speech act whereas Rorty, influenced by Quine [74, pp. 23–25], believed in a
9 Several concepts have been used in different stages to mean the rules of acceptable discourse
developed by Apel and Habermas, such as the ideal speech act, undistorted communication, universal
pragmatics and transcendental pragmatics.
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relativistic non-systematic discussion, because he could not find any universal truth
in a rigorous process.10
It is somewhat difficult to imagine examples for this school of thought in the
futures studies domain, although self-organised futures workshops might be thought
of as an example. Methodological connections to this approach can be found in the
methods of story-telling, purely heuristic scenario writing, communication camps
and causal layered analysis [16,75, pp. 351–352]. This school of thought has qualities
of Inayatullah’s critical-post-structural approach, Masini’s utopia, Sandberg’s,
Slaughter’s and Mannermaa’s emancipatory, Amara’s preferable and Bell’s post-
positivism.
Relativism has been criticised by Popper [43, pp. 381–382] and later Bell [17, p.
236], to lead to nihilism. They thought that if no moral position can be considered
better than another, people could act any way they pleased and might oppress each
other without a ground. The line of thought is logically possible, but not the only
one. One might as well claim that because there are no generally approved criteria
for goodness, we must have a democratic society to decide upon what kind of laws
and norms we need to live by. In fact, the second view is usually promoted by
relativists [29,68,69].11
2.7. Democratic anarchism
In the last school of thought all the phases are performed by the public. In other
words a total direct citizen participation would occur, implying anarchism or some
sort of ideal democratic civil society such as Aristotle’s “politeia”.12
Philosophically, the last school of thought presents an extreme version of relativ-
ism, where anything goes as an argument, because there cannot be any substantial
nor procedural principles to guarantee a good decision. Some connections can be
traced back to the thinking of Paul Feyerabend [76, pp. 18–19], who supported the
‘anything goes’ principle for all inquiries. He also disfavoured argumentation rules
and preferred an open process [76, pp. 268–270]. And, like Rorty, he also insisted
that his rule, or rather anti-rule, would lead to a more democratic society [76, pp.
12, 251].
But is there a philosophical difference between this democratic anarchism and the
former two pragmatist schools of thought? We suggest that the extreme relativist
10 Calling this and the former school pragmatism has some problems, because the concept originates
from Charles Sanders Peirce who was not a relativist but was in favour of the realist theory of objective
truth [70, pp. 77—78; 71, pp. 47–49; 72, pp. 353—357]. The concept of pragmatism was made famous
especially by William James, whose thinking included more relativistic subjective aspects and are of
concern here [73, pp. 37—54; 71, pp. 48—50].
11 Rorty did not call himself a relativist because for him it was the name of the ‘anything goes’ principle
[69, pp. 166—168].
12 Anarchism can be interpreted in two ways: First, it can be seen as an overly individualistic and
egoistic enterprise as was feared by Hobbes. Second, it can be seen as a form of communicative civil
society where social life-world has been emancipated from distorting institutions. The latter perspective
is adopted here, hence the pre-fix ‘democratic’.
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anarchist school would include a metaphysical claim that the reality itself includes
many truths, not only different interpretations of one truth as the pragmatists argue
[76, p. 270]. The position is present in the Leibnizian metaphysics called ”mona-
dology” [77, pp. 215–271]. There is no logical connection between the theory of
truth and theories of participatory democracy, but this assumption makes the gradient
complete from the strictest analytical positivist thinking to the most loose heuristic
relativism. A second argument for separation is Rorty’s argument against the ‘any-
thing goes’ type of discourse [69, p. 166].
Extreme relativistic thought and anarchism can seldom be found in the texts of
futures researchers. Some traces of it can, for example, be found in utopian texts,13
science fiction literature and movies [11,80]. Of the typologies reviewed in Section
1, Inayatullah’s critical-post-structural epistemology, Masini’s utopian approach and
Bell’s post-positivism seem to be closest to these ideas and also Amara’s preferable
seems to encompass the most radical version of relativism.
2.8. Summary of the typology
Above, we have examined how the role of professionals, decision-makers and the
public could be defined in a long-term planning and decision-making process (also
see the Appendix). We formed seven schools of thought, presenting a gradient from
extreme technocracy to extreme public participation, and then connected the gradient
to futures research practices (Table 1).
We interpreted the seven schools of thought in the light of the philosophical dis-
course on the role of knowledge and values in making policy recommendations. They
seem to form a gradient from strict, analytical, deterministic, value- and knowledge
objectivist positivism to loose, interpretative, non-deterministic, value- and knowl-
edge subjectivist relativism (Table 2).
The two gradients from technocracy to citizen participation and from objectivism
to relativism seem to converge. However, convergence is not inevitable, because
different philosophical positions can lead to similar practical social conclusions and
from the same philosophical starting points it is possible to end up with different
practical conclusions. In order to establish the connection one must (explicitly or
implicitly) also apply some other social premises. For example, extreme relativism
can lead to nihilism or to democratic public participation, depending on the other
premises.
3. Paradigm shift in Finnish transport futures studies
In this section we use the new typology to analyse the paradigm shift of national
transport futures studies made by the Finnish transport administration in the 1990s.
13 For example the utopy of the ideal communism was meant to emancipate citizens from the “realm
of necessity” to the “realm of true freedom”, i.e. leisure time reproduction [78, p. 820]. However, Marx’
epistemology was positivist, not extreme relativist. Also a more relativist and non-deterministic new left
branch of Marxism developed in the 20th century (see e.g. [79, pp. 225—235, 241—242, 252].
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Table 1
Seven paradigms of the roles of professionals, decision-makers and the public in a long-term decision-
making process and some corresponding methodological applications
Phase of planning and Formation of Assessment of Final decision- Examples of
decision-making process possible futures desirablity making methodological
applications
School of thought
Comtean positivism Professional Professional Professional Deterministic
models
Optimistic humanism Professional Professional Decision-maker Epistemic
(e.g. Bell’s ‘critical implication model
realism’)
Pluralistic humanism (e.g. Professional Professional & Decision-maker What-if models
scenario paradigm) decision-maker
Polling democracy (e.g. Professional Professional & Decision-maker What-if models
policy analysis) decision-maker & including opinion
public polling
Critical pragmatism (e.g. Professional & Decision-maker & Decision-maker Future workshops
Forester) decision-maker & public
public
Relativistic pragmatism Decision- Decision-maker & Decision-maker Story telling,
(e.g. Rorty) maker & public public heuristic scenario
writing
Democratic anarchism Public Public Public Science fiction
(e.g. Feyerabend)
3.1. Traffic and automobile stock forecast 1989–2010
As described and analysed in detail in the reference [29], the planning documents
of the Finnish Road Administration (FinnRA) in the beginning of the 1990s presented
an example of Comtean positivism in the way futures research was carried out and
applied in the context of planning and decision-making. In the Traffic and Automobile
Forecast 1989–2010 for Finland made in 1989–1990 [81], deterministic mathemat-
ical models were used and in a road project level case a ‘what—if’ type of model
was used in a deterministic manner.
There were alternative developments of road traffic volumes in the case, but these
developments were not formed by varying factors internal to decision-making, but
varying the GDP assumption as making a sensitivity analysis. Only the “business as
usual” estimate of the most probable future estimated by the futurists was used in
the planning process. It was not possible for citizens to participate in forming the
alternatives, nor evaluation, nor decision-making.
3.2. Traffic and automobile forecast 1995–2020
There are signs that the futures studies of transport administration changed in 1995
as FinnRA published a follow-up forecast for 1995–2020 [82]. It included three
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Table 2
The role and essence of knowledge and values in making policy recommendations in different schools
of thought in the new typology
School of thought Knowledge and values in policy recommendations
Comtean positivism Recommendations are derived from objective knowledge, values are not
needed.
— — the line between determinism and indeterminism —
Optimistic humanism Recommendations are derived from objective knowledge and objective
values.
— — the line between value objectivism and value relativism —
Pluralistic humanism Recommendations are derived from objective knowledge and subjective
values.
Polling democracy Recommendations are derived from objective knowledge, including
knowledge on subjective values.
— — the line between epistemological realism and relativism —
Critical pragmatism Recommendations are derived from intersubjective knowledge and
intersubjective values.
Relativistic pragmatism Recommendations are derived from subjective knowledge and subjective
values.
— — the line between argumentation and ‘anything goes’ —
Democratic anarchy Recommendations cannot be derived at all because knowledge is biased
and values are too subjective.
alternative scenarios: “business as usual”, “market driven” and “sustainable growth”.
The qualitative background factors of the different road traffic scenarios were
presented in tabular form [82, pp. 154–160]. In the actual model calculations the
variants were the annual average car kilometres and passenger car density [82, p.
160]. Freight transport figures were not varied.
The scenarios were produced by the futurists within FinnRA and because alterna-
tive policy scenarios were offered to decision-makers based on the what-if analysis,
the approach could be characterised as pluralist humanism. However, the “business
as usual” forecast was elaborated further than the other two scenarios without any
alternative figures to be used in project level. It seems that although the futures study
itself was made following the what-if principle, the actual role of “business as usual”
forecasts in the planning process was not changed. Therefore, as an institutional
element the study would belong to optimistic humanism.14
3.3. The visionary process 1997–2020
In the late 1980s and 1990s several transport administrators and researchers outside
administration proposed that the transport system should be dealt with as a whole,
a wider set of factors should be taken into account and more policy alternatives
14 This does not mean that the professionals would themselves promote optimistic humanism—quite
the contrary [83].
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should be offered when making futures studies of transport [84, p. 16]. The Ministry
of Transport and Communications responded by taking initiative on the matter.
The Visionary process was carried out in 1997 by the Ministry. It was conducted
to develop a process to produce a vision for the transport system. Four available
‘best-practise’ mathematical what-if models were used by private consultants guided
by administrative officers in the ministry. They calculated a “business as usual”
scenario and three alternative transport policy scenarios, or “visions”: (1) market
driven, (2) regional and social equity driven and (3) environmentally driven [85, pp.
26–29].
The alternative scenarios had similar assumptions about economic growth rate and
governmentary budget of transport. No wider life-style issues, structural changes in
the economy nor different regional policy options were dealt with [85, p. 21]. The
results presented only little difference in terms of traffic volumes and modal split
[85, pp. 34–35].
The visionary process was continued by making an evaluation of the different
policy goals presented in governmental committee reports. The goals were discussed
in seminars within the ministry, and by interviewing representatives in the sectoral
transport administration and the Confederation of Finnish Industry and Employers.
A questionnaire to transport experts was also made to determine the weightings of
the different goals [85, p. 24]. Relying on the expert poll and discussion within the
ministry, another scenario called “the target transport system” was specified as a
combination of the three alternative visions.
The visionary process could be characterised as pluralistic humanism in the sense
that it pursued the formation of alternative policies and involved several groups
participating in the decision making process. However, the evaluation of the goals
was made by experts, which implies that some traces of the school of optimistic
humanism can be found as well. The output was less varied than the FinnRA 1995
scenarios, thus presenting a somewhat incrementalist view of the range of possible
policies.
3.4. Traffic scenarios 1999–2025
Whereas the visionary process relied on one external scenario in each transport
policy scenario, the Traffic Scenarios 2025 project was carried out to form wider
scenarios of factors affecting transport [86, p. 1]. It was performed by a group of
consultants without economic interest in technical transport planning, the correspond-
ing author belonging to the group.
Instead of mathematical models, an application of the scenario workshop method
developed by Tarja Meristo¨ [62] was used, presenting a more communicative and
less formal approach. Several methods were used under the umbrella of the scenario
workshop: working groups, a Delphi study and participatory seminars for interest
groups. Thematic expert interviews were performed on three specific, less investi-
gated topics, namely air transport, soft modes and values, and attitudes relevant to
transport behaviour. The Delphi and the expert interviews were used to gather poss-
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ible future developments of relevant factors, which were then gathered to a morpho-
logical matrix [86].
The international scenarios were formed based on the literature, global scenarios
made by Shell and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)
and another set of scenarios for Europe made by Meristo¨, being similar to scenarios
made by the Forward Studies Unit of the EU [86, pp. 16–24].
A more specific set of traffic scenarios was formed in connection with the Euro-
pean and global scenarios. In the seminars for interest groups the scenarios were
outlined, criticised, rephrased, grouped and reformed [86, pp. 26–28]. This feature
would make the Traffic Scenarios 2025 project an example of critical pragmatism.
However, the first outline of the traffic oriented scenarios was made based on a
literature review of one of the consultants [86, p. 25] (see [87]). Although the scen-
arios were substantially changed in the course of the project and the final scenarios
were different from the first outline, this feature makes the exercise reminiscent of
polling democracy as well.
The final traffic scenarios were grouped under five characterising headlines, which
were called ‘scenario channels’ in the report: scenarios of economic growth, scen-
arios of structural change, scenarios of changed values, collapse scenarios and scen-
arios of technological leaps [86, pp. 9, 34–36]. Although the method was qualitative,
quantitative estimates of passenger transport and freight transport were specified to
illustrate concretely the differences between the scenarios [86, pp. 70–73].
The wide range of scenarios produced in Traffic Scenarios 2025 project was used
in forming the transport strategy of Finland called Towards Intelligent and Sus-
tainable Transport 2025 by the Ministry of Transport and Communications [88].
None of the scenarios was adopted as such but a combination of two was constructed
within the ministry. In the strategy report, different variables had different time scales
and the freight transport volume was suggested to grow clearly faster than passenger
car traffic. Some inconsistency can therefore be observed.
The procedural development of the futures studies of transport administration in
the 1990s can be summarised as follows (Fig. 2): In the beginning of the 1990s it
Fig. 2. The development of Finnish national transport futures studies in the 1990s.
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presented Comtean positivism, then moved towards a mixture of optimistic human-
ism and pluralistic humanism in the middle of the decade. At the end of the decade,
a mixture of polling democracy and critical pragmatism was experimented with. The
paradigm shift was impressive.
4. Discussion
The purpose of the article was to continue the work of reviewed authors in order
to construct a new typology of futures studies paradigms. The new typology consists
of seven paradigms which are mapped onto the reviewed typologies in Table 3. What
can be usefully drawn from the new typology?
First, the typology can increase self-understanding and learning in more practical
works; are we involved in policy processes implying philosophical positions which
contradict our own basic assumptions?
Table 3
A meta-map of six typologies of futures studies paradigms in relation to the new typology: An analysis
of the differences and similaritiesa
Amara Sandberg 1975 Inayatullah Mannermaa Masini Bell
1981 Slaughter 1982 1990 1991 1993 1997
Mannermaa
1986
Comtean Probable Technical Predictive– Descriptive Extrapolation Positivism
positivism empirical
Optimistic Probable, Technical Predictive– Descriptive & Extrapolation Critical
humanism possible & empirical Evolutionary realism
preferable
Pluralistic Possible & Hermeneutic/ Cultural– Scenario Vision Critical
humanism preferable practical interpretative paradigm realism
Polling Possible & Hermeneutic/ Cultural– Scenario Vision Critical
democracy preferable practical interpretative paradigm & realism
evolutionary
Critical Preferable Hermeneutic/ Cultural– Scenario Vision Critical
pragmatism practical & interpretative paradigm & realism
Emancipatory evolutionary
Relativistic Preferable Hermeneutic/ Cultural– Evolutionary Utopia Post-
pragmatism practical & interpretative positivism
Emancipatory
Democratic Preferable – Critical–post– – Utopia Post-
anarchism structural positivism
a The connections relate only to questions of forming alternatives, evaluating the alternatives and mak-
ing the decision, as well as the views on knowledge and values in forming policy recommendations (see
Tables 1 and 2). The six typologies also present other characteristics which are outside the scope of the
map, such as theories of change, the futurist’s individual morals, theories of social development, percep-
tions of time etc. Thus, this Table should not be regarded as a complete summary of the typologies of
futures studies paradigms.
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Second, it can be used as a yardstick for normative analysis (depending on one’s
position); how far are we from our own ideal? Or as a value objectivist might ask:
how far are we from the true ideal?
Third, the new typology can be used as a tool for analysis of empirical policy
processes; which school of thought does a case represent? We analysed four empiri-
cal cases of administrative transport futures studies in Finland during the 1990s and
conclude that the new typology is a good analytical tool to reveal the rapid paradigm
shift, which the cases represent. However, we must keep in mind that the actual
planning processes on a project level may well be lagging behind. We can only
imagine how much confusion and resistance the paradigm shift has provoked in
regard to the many philosophical barriers trespassed.
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Appendix A. : Forming the typology by using the Futulogic method
This appendix presents the Futulogic method of producing the new typology of
futures studies paradigms. The phases of the method are as follows:
 dividing two categories of interest into sub-categories,
 cross-matrixing the sub-categories,
 opening the space of logically possible alternatives,
 cutting the open space by theoretically grounded criteria,
 removing less relevant (non-understandable and almost overlapping) alternatives,
 theoretical interpretation of remaining alternatives.
Dividing and cross-matrixing categories
First, long term planning and decision-making is broken down into three main
phases:
1. formation of the alternatives (problem formulation, production of policy alterna-
tives and forecasting the impacts of the alternatives),
2. evaluation of the alternatives,
3. making the decision.
Another point of interest are the roles of different actors involved in the process.
615P. Tapio, O. Hietanen / Futures 34 (2002) 597–620
The main actors involved in the process can be divided into three groups as well
(see [89, p. 679] and Section 2 in the main body of text):
 (dec)decision-makers (politicians, managers, judges and other formal authorities),
 (pro)professionals (futurists, consultants, administrative officers, researchers and
other experts),
 (pub) the public (interest groups as well as individual citizens and media).
Opening the logical possibility space
The phases can be cross-matrixed with the actors so that each actor can be pos-
itioned to any phase of the process. Because there are xy ways to combine the three
phases (y) logically with the three groups (x), it follows that there are (33)=27 alterna-
tive ways of defining the role of professionals, the public and decision-makers in a
long term decision-making process. However, two or three of the groups may in
practice participate in the same phase. This raises the number of alternative solutions
within a phase to seven. It follows that the number of alternative logical solutions
to the whole process is increased to 73=343 (www.tukkk.fi/tutu/Julkaisut/pdf/
Tutu3F01.pdf).
It is important to note that, if professionals are mentioned together with public,
it means that professionals have a special role in the process. If the professionals
do not have a special role in the process, they are categorised here as the public, no
matter how much expertise they possess.
Cutting the logical possibility space
Now we have opened the space of logically possible hypothetical schools of
thought from the matrix. It is obvious that some of the logical possibilities are irrel-
evant and 343 possibilities are too many to be practically analysed or illustrated one
by one. Thus, we will proceed by scanning the open space with explicit selection
criteria. Riner [90, p. 318] provides one criterion in his continuum of “‘Softer’, more
qualitative, synthetic” vs “‘Harder’, more quantitative, analytical” objectives and
methods in futures research. Slaughter’s continuum from “futures research” to
“futures movement” includes a similar idea [11, p. 6]. Another tool is adopted from
Tapio [29], namely the gradient from technocracy to citizen participation. These
continuities seem to converge rather than cross each other.
One line of samples from the logically open space can then be formed by starting
from extreme technocracy (pro—pro—pro) towards including decision-makers and
then the public. The other end of the continuum consists of extreme direct public
participation (pub—pub—pub).
Let us assume that it is relevant to start the widening of actors involved from the
phase of the final decision by including decision-makers into the scheme and move
on to include decision-makers to earlier and earlier phases of the process. This is
because the claim for increasing participation in the earlier phases of the process
implies important epistemological foundations and the claim for maintaining the
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phase of forming alternatives in the hands of professionals seems to be ‘the last
resort’ of realistic and positivist epistemologies.
Importing the public to the process can arguably be formed differently. Final
decision-making can be seen as ‘the last resort’ of the point of having decision-
makers at all, especially in a representative system. Importing public to the process
would probably mean a broader base for decision material at the first stage. There-
fore, when dealing with the decision-makers and public only, we would start
importing the public from the beginning of the process.
With the two ‘last resort’ arguments mentioned above, we start by dropping the
professionals from the final decision phase and holding them as long as possible as
the only actors in the first phase of forming the alternatives. Thus we start importing
the public to the middle of the process, i.e. evaluating the alternatives. In the latter
stage there are two alternatives: to first exclude professionals altogether or to first
include the public in the final decision phase. We leave the scheme open for these
options for now.
Fig. 3 illustrates the alternatives that have so far been cut theoretically from the
open space of logical possibility. The alternatives form a gradient of 15 hypothetical
schools of thought making the gradient from technocracy to citizen participation
logically well-argued. We have thus reduced the alternatives under scrutiny from
343 to 15 with fairly few assumptions.
Relevance analysis
In the next phase we will exclude those options that seem to have no relevant
interpretation, meaning the ones that seem not to have an understandable interpret-
Fig. 3. The continuum from technocracy to citizen participation based on cutting the logically possible
space theoretically.
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ation, and the ones that do not imply differences in underlying philosophy
(practically overlapping).
Of the 15 hypothetical schools of thought the six that had more than one actor
group in the last phase of final decision-making seemed to lack understandable
interpretation. It is difficult to grasp the idea and point of, for example, a voting
system capable of simultaneously combining elected decision-makers and the public.
Thus we are left with nine schools of thought.
We further combine (pro—pro&dec&pub—dec) with (pro&dec—pro&dec&
pub—dec) and (pro&dec&pub—pro&dec&pub—dec) with (pro&dec&pub—dec&
pub—dec), because they seem similar to each other in terms of philosophical impli-
cations. The point is illustrated further in Section 2.8. Thus we finally end up with
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